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A conjunction error is a judgment that a conjunctive event is more likely 
than one of the marginal events comprising the conjunction. Previous research 
has demonstrated conjunction errors in situations in which marginal events 
arose from a common generating process. In Studies 1-3, conjunction errors 
were reliably induced in cases where marginal events resulted from unrelated 
processes. This suggests that conjunction errors can be produced by “formal- 
istic” judgment procedures, by which probability judgments for conjunctions 
are derived from probability judgments for marginal events according to some 
combination rule. Protocols from Studies 2 and 3 also indicated that subjects 
use multiple judgment procedures, several of which are capable of yielding 
conjunction errors. One new procedure suggested by the protocols is for- 
malized in a “signed sum model.” In this model, an event’s likelihood is 
represented by a positive number, a negative number, or zero, depending on 
whether the event is considered likely, unlikely, or neither, respectively. The 
likelihood value for a conjunction is the sum of those for the constituent mar- 
ginal events. In Study 4, this model successfully predicted when some sub- 
jects made zero, one, or tW0 COnjUnCtiOn errors. 0 1986 Academic Press. Inc. 
Imagine a person is presented with the following judgment problem: 
Consider arbitrary events A and B. Which is more likely to occur, event 
B or event [A & B], the conjunction of events A and B? 
The conjunction rule of elementary probability theory requires that 
event [A & B] cannot be more likely than either event A or event B, i.e., 
P(A & B) G P(A) and P(A & B) 6 P(B). This conclusion is a consequence 
of what Tversky and Kahneman (1983) describe as the “extension rule” 
of probability. The extension rule says that any event is at least as prob- 
able as any other event it contains. The rule applies in the present situa- 
tion because the conjunctive event [A & B] is contained both in event A 
and in event B. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982, 1983) have brought attention to in- 
stances in which humans’ qualitative likelihood judgments reliably vio- 
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late the conjunction rule. That is, their subjects commonly made state- 
ments of the form [A & B] >L B, where >L denotes a subjective qualita- 
tive likelihood relation, meaning that event [A & B] is considered more 
likely than event B. We will refer to a judgment that a conjunction is more 
likely than one of its constituent marginal events as a “conjunction 
error. ’ ’ 1 
One of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1982) problems illustrates how con- 
junction errors often have been demonstrated. Subjects were given the 
following personality sketch of a hypothetical person (p. 92): “Bill is 34 
years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive, and generally 
lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social 
studies and humanities.” Subjects were then asked to rank order eight 
statements about Bill by their probability. Included in the list of state- 
ments were A = “Bill is an accountant,” J = “Bill plays jazz for a 
hobby,” and [A & J] = “Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for 
a hobby.” (The subjects presumably did not see event labels such as 
“A” and “A & J.“) Many of the subjects ranked the events A >,. 
[A & J] >L J. 
Why do people commit conjunction errors? This is the general issue 
considered in the research reported here. Previous results suggest several 
hypotheses. 
One potential explanation of conjunction errors is that people are un- 
aware of the conjunction rule. If this explanation has validity, then prior 
exposure to statistical training should decrease the incidence of conjunc- 
tion errors. Evidence on the issue is mixed. In some tests, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982, p. 93) found that statistical training had negligible ef- 
fects on conjunction errors. In others (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983, p. 
300), they discovered that subjects who had had several courses in sta- 
tistics were much less likely to make conjunction errors. 
A second hypothesis is that people who are aware of the conjunction 
rule do not accept its propriety. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) tested this 
hypothesis, too. Subjects who had responded to the above “Bill 
problem” were presented with the argument that “the probability that 
Bill is both an accountant and a jazz player cannot exceed the probability 
I Tversky and Kahneman (1982) initially described any violation of the conjunction rule 
as a “conjunction effect.” More recently (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). they have applied 
the term “conjunction fallacy” to the occurrence of such a violation in a within-subjects 
design. They have used the expression “conjunction error” to describe conjunction rule 
violations revealed in between-subjects designs. We have found it easier to follow the con- 
vention taken by Morier and Borgida (1984). These authors appear to apply the term “con- 
junction error” to any specific violation of the conjunction rule. They reserve “conjunction 
fallacy” for the general phenomenon whereby such errors take place. 
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that he is a jazz player, because every member of the former category is 
also a member of the latter” (p. 95). Subjects who committed conjunction 
errors generally agreed that their judgments were mistakes, because they 
conflicted with the conjunction rule. Another test was not so favorable to 
the acceptance hypothesis. Tversky and Kahneman (1983, pp. 299-300) 
asked subjects to compare the convincingness of two arguments con- 
cerning the probability ordering of a conjunction and a constituent mar- 
ginal event. One argument was essentially the same as the above exten- 
sional one. The other defended conjunction errors on the basis of the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). A majority of 
the subjects found the representativeness argument more compelling. 
Markus and Zajonc (in press) propose that conjunction errors result 
from the subject misunderstanding what the events are whose chances of 
occurrence are being requested. For example, in the Bill problem, the 
presence of the event [A & J] = “Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for 
a hobby” may lead to the misinterpretation of the event J = “Bill plays 
jazz for a hobby” as the event [A’ & J] = “Bill is a nonaccountant who 
plays jazz for a hobby,” where the prime on A’ indicates the complement 
of event A. Although [A & J] >r J necessarily violates probability theory, 
the judgment [A & J] >L [A’ & J] does not. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983, p. 299) asked subjects to rate the proba- 
bility of events of the form [A & B] and B. They found that the ratings 
violated the conjunction rule, too, i.e., rating (A & B) > rating (B). This 
result was taken as evidence against the misunderstanding hypothesis. 
The apparent reasoning behind this conclusion is that, since the events 
were rated independently of each other, the event B should not have been 
misinterpreted as the event [A’ & B]. 
Morier and Borgida (1984) tested the misunderstanding hypothesis 
more directly. This was done by asking subjects to rank order the proba- 
bilities of events in a list that included not only those of the form A, B, 
and [A & B], but an explicit statement of event [A’ & B], too. Seeing 
event [A’ & B] in the list, the subject should not then confuse it with 
event B. Morier and Borgida found that the inclusion of [A’ & B] reduced 
the incidence of conjunction errors in one of two judgment problems pre- 
sented to subjects, but not the other. So, again, there is mixed support for 
the proposed explanation for conjunction errors. 
Judgment research over the past several years has shown that people 
make likelihood judgments according to a wide variety of procedures (cf. 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Pitz & Sachs, 1984; Rapaport & Wallsten, 
1972; Slavic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1977). Some of those procedures 
allow conjunction errors; others do not. The explanation for conjunction 
errors proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1983) can be viewed in these 
terms. Specifically, these authors hypothesize that people sometimes 
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make judgments by procedures that inadvertently permit conjunction 
errors to happen. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983, p. 294) indicate that “natural assess- 
ments are routinely carried out as part of the perception of events. . . 
Such natural assessments include computations of similarity and repre- 
sentativeness, attributions of causality, and evaluations of the availability 
of associations and exemplars.” Further, they argue (p. 310) that “a 
judgment of probability or frequency is commonly biased toward the nat- 
ural assessment that the problem evokes. . . . These assessments are not 
constrained by the extension rule.” In particular, judgments made ac- 
cording to the representativeness and availability (Tversky & Kahneman. 
1973) heuristics are natural assessments that can yield conjunction 
errors. For example, in the Bill problem, “Bill is an accountant who 
plays jazz for a hobby” is judged more likely than “Bill plays jazz for a 
hobby” because the former event is more representative of Bill’s person- 
ality sketch than the latter. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) offer similar 
demonstrations of how judgments according to availability can produce 
conjunction errors. 
There is another class of judgment procedures that, in principle, could 
account for some conjunction errors. What might be called “formalistic” 
procedures share the following characterization: The person’s task re- 
quires that likelihood judgments be made for several events. Judgments 
for some of those events are made directly. That is. direct judgments do 
not rely upon any other likelihood judgments. However, judgments for 
the remaining events are derived- consciously or otherwise-from 
judgments for other events according to combination rules accepted by 
the person. Judgment via probability theory would be an example of a 
formalistic procedure. Suppose, for instance, that a probability judgment 
for the event [A & B] is required. Assuming that events A and B are 
independent, the desired judgment can be derived from judgments for the 
events A and B: P’(A & B) = P’(A)P’(B), where the notation P' indicates 
a probability judgment.” 
Shanteau (1975) and Troutman and Shanteau ( 1977) have demonstrated 
that some probability judgments can be well described by the formalistic 
procedure of averaging. In a study more directly relevant to the present 
problem, Wyer (1976) asked subjects to report probability judgments 
for marginal, conditional, and conjunctive events, e.g., A, B, AIB, and 
[A & B]. He indicated (p. 9) that, “Indeed. estimates of PAB were less 
2 The term “probability judgment” rather than “subjective probability” is used to em- 
phasize that the person’s judgments may or may not satisfy all the probability axioms. 
“Subjective probability” implies that the axioms rrr’r satisfied, the very issue being con- 
tested here. 
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than the estimates of both component probabilities (e.g., both PA and P,) 
in only a minority of cases.” Thus, Wyer obtained clear evidence of con- 
junction errors in quantitative likelihood judgment. Wyer also found that 
the best models for his subjects’ responses included both a multiplying 
component (consistent with probability theory) and an averaging compo- 
nent. The averaging component requires that, if event A is judged more 
likely than event B, then P’(A) > P’(A & B) > P’(B). Virtually all re- 
ported instances of conjunction errors, e.g., in the Bill problem, have 
involved situations in which one of the marginal events seems highly 
probable while the other appears remote. Consistent with averaging, sub- 
jects generally have judged the conjunction to be more likely than one of 
the constituent marginal events, but not the other. 
This brief review has indicated that conjunction errors are compatible 
with several previously proposed explanations. It is conceivable that 
there is a single mechanism that fully accounts for all conjunction errors. 
This appears doubtful, however. It is more plausible that, on different 
occasions, conjunction errors occur for each of the reasons that have 
been offered. There may well be other sources of conjunction errors, too. 
So a legitimate goal is to work toward completing the catalog of docu- 
mented conjunction error explanations. Such was the aim of the studies 
reported here. 
STUDY 1 
The evidence for conjunction errors arising from natural assessments is 
convincing. However, are there conjunction errors that can be explained 
by formalistic procedures, but not natural assessments? Although Wyer’s 
(1976) data are consistent with an averaging explanation of conjunction 
errors, they are also compatible with an account according to natural 
assessments. An approach for comparing these explanations is implicit in 
an observation made by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). These authors 
note that judgments of the representativeness (and hence probability) of a 
conjunction of events A and B are affected by the compatibility of the 
two events. As a corollary, they submit that 
the judged probability (or representativeness) of a conjunction cannot be computed 
as a function (e.g., product, sum, minimum, weighted average) of the scale values 
of its constituents. This conclusion excludes a large class of formal models that 
ignore the relation between the constituents of a conjunction. (p. 305) 
Suppose that the constituent marginal events in a conjunction are gen- 
erated by processes that are unrelated to each other. Then it seems im- 
plausible that natural assessments could lead to conjunction errors. On 
the other hand, formalistic procedures, including operations equivalent to 
averaging, could. It so happens that the marginal events in the conjunc- 
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tions studied by Wyer (1976) involved common rather than unrelated 
processes. In one type of conjunction, for example, one marginal event 
was that a person possessed a certain gene, while the other was that that 
individual exhibited a particular characteristic. The present study tested 
for the occurrence of conjunction errors in situations in which marginal 
events did indeed appear to rest upon unrelated processes. 
Method 
Subjects 
The 78 subjects in the study were students in introductory psychology 
courses at the University of Michigan. They participated in the study as a 
course credit option; they were not paid. 
Materials 
Five judgment problems were presented in questionnaire form. De- 
scriptions of the marginal events in each problem, denoted by A and B, 
are contained in Table 1. 
In each problem, the task was to rank order several events from most 
to least likely, using 1 for the most probable event, 2 for the second-most 
probable event, and so on. The McEnroe problem was introduced with 
the statement, “Suppose John McEnroe plays in the first round of the 
TABLE 1 
FOCAL MARGINAL EVENTS IN LIKELIHOOD JUDGMENT PROBLEMS: STUDY 1 
Event 








McEnroe will win the 
match 
Reagan will cut federal 
support to local 
government 
Governor Blanchard will 
succeed in raising 
the Michigan state 
income tax 
The University of 
Michigan regents will 
increase tuition 
next year 
The marble you draw from 
the second jar is 
black 
McEnroe will lose the 
first set 
Reagan will provide 
federal support for 
unwed mothers 
Bo Derek will win an 
Academy Award for 
the movie that she 
is currently making 
Ray Floyd will win 
the U.S. Open golf 
tournament 
The marble you draw from 
the first jar is red 
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Wimbledon tennis tournament in June of this year.” Afterward, the sub- 
ject was asked to rank order in likelihood the events whose descriptions 
followed. The Reagan, BlanchardDerek, and Regents/Floyd problems 
were all introduced with the simple request, “Please rank order the fol- 
lowing events by their probability of occurrence in 1983.” The introduc- 
tion to the Urn problem was the following: 
Suppose that two jars containing different colored marbles are set on a table before 
you. The first jar contains 5 red and 20 blue marbles. The second jar contains 80 
black and 10 white marbles. Without looking, you draw one marble from each jar. 
The subject was then instructed to rank in order of likelihood the events 
described thereafter. Included in the list of events to be rank ordered in 
each problem were A, B, and their conjunction, [A & B]. The event lists 
for the McEnroe, Reagan, Blanchard/Derek, and Regents/Floyd 
problems also contained a fourth event. 
The McEnroe and Reagan problems were adapted directly from 
problems introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1982). In the original 
version of the McEnroe problem, the tennis player was Bjorn Borg, who 
has since retired. Tversky and Kahneman (1982, p. 96) described the 
conjunction in the tennis problem as “Borg will lose the first set but win 
the match,” using the connective but rather than the more conventional 
and, which was used in their version of the Reagan problem. To deter- 
mine whether that distinction makes a difference, two forms of the 
McEnroe and Reagan problems were used in the present study, one con- 
taining the but connective, the other the and connective. The and con- 
nective was employed in all other problems. 
In contrast to the McEnroe and Reagan problems, the Blanchard/ 
Derek and Regents/Floyd problems concerned marginal events we judged 
to be generated from unrelated rather than common processes. Michigan 
fiscal politics appeared to us as remote from film making. Similarly, it 
was difficult for us to see how a common process could account for the 
setting of University of Michigan tuition rates and the outcome of the 
U.S. Open golf tournament. 
All the problems were designed such that-as in the McEnroe and 
Reagan problems-most subjects would be expected to judge A >L B. At 
the time the study was conducted, William Blanchard, Governor of the 
State of Michigan, was lobbying hard for an increase in the state income 
tax to relieve a budget crisis. His success was heavily predicted by news- 
paper and television political analysts. Most students were thought to be 
aware that the University of Michigan’s regents had increased tuition 
practically every year in the previous decade, and most observers felt 
they would continue to do so. The chances of Bo Derek winning an 
Academy Award and of Ray Floyd winning the U.S. Open golf tourna- 
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ment were expected to be seen as slight in part because of the tre- 
mendous competition for those prizes. 
The selection of balls from an urn, as in the Urn problem, is a transpar- 
ently random process. The Urn problem also admits a readily accessible 
extensional cognitive representation that should facilitate a proper or- 
dering of the events, assuming that people understand the principle im- 
plicit in the conjunction rule. So responses to the Urn problem should 
have provided a point of reference for responses to the other problems. 
Procedure 
Subjects were assigned to small group sessions (1- 15 subjects) at the 
convenience of their schedules. The McEnroe, Reagan, Blanchard/ 
Derek, and Regents/Floyd problems were presented in a “Part 1” ques- 
tionnaire. The McEnroe and Reagan problems were presented first as a 
randomized pair. An intermediate task not relevant to the present study 
followed the BlanchardiDerek and Regents/Floyd problems. After all the 
Part 1 materials were collected, the Urn problem was presented in a 
“Part 2” questionnaire. At all stages of the procedure, subjects were al- 
lowed and encouraged to ask questions about the tasks being requested 
of them. A postexperimental questionnaire asked the subject if he or she 
had ever taken a course in which probability had been taught. 
Results 
No significant presentation order effects were observed. The subjects’ 
responses were also unaffected by their prior exposure to probability 
concepts. Another negative finding was that whether the connective in 
the McEnroe and Reagan problems was and or but did not influence the 
incidence of conjunction errors. Accordingly, the summary of results de- 
scribed below ignores that distinction. 
Table 2 presents the percentages of judged likelihood ordering patterns 
found in Study 1. These percentages are easily demonstrated to result 
from nonrandom responding. 
The Total conjunction error row of Table 2 shows, for each problem, 
the percentage of all patterns which violate the conjunction rule. Ac- 
cording to Cochran’s (1950) test for comparisons of percentages in 
matched samples, the incidence of conjunction rule violations was signifi- 
cantly lower for the Urn problem than for the other problems (Q(l) = 
31.78, p < .OOl). A significant majority of the subjects made no conjunc- 
tion errors on the Urn problem (p < .OOl). In contrast, for each of the 
other problems a majority of the subjects made at least one conjunction 
error, although the only majority that was statistically significant was in 
the McEnroe problem (I, < .OOl). Of particular importance is the fact that 
the total incidences of conjunction errors for the non-Urn problems dif- 
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TABLE 2 























41.4 42.3 55.10 53.8 28.2b 
12.8 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10.2 11.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 
70.5 57.7 56.4 55.1 29.5 
29.5 42.3 43.6 44.9 70.5 
Note. N = 18. 
0 Includes one case in which A = L A&B >, B, where = L denotes judged equal likeli- 
hood. 
b Includes three cases in which A = L A&B & B. 
fered from one another only marginally significantly (Q(3) = 6.73, .05 < 
p < .lO), even though double conjunction errors (i.e., [A & B] >= A and 
[A & B] >L B) were more prevalent for the McEnroe and Reagan 
problems than all others (Q(l) = 17.76, p < .Ol). The frequency of con- 
junction errors in Study 1 was much less than that reported by Tversky 
and Kahneman (1982). It is not obvious why this was so. 
The Single conjunction error rows of Table 2 present the percentages of 
event orderings involving a single conjunction error. These include the 
patterns one would expect if subjects made judgments according to an 
averaging type of procedure. If, as anticipated, subjects considered event 
A more likely than event B, then averaging would predict the ordering A 
>,- [A & B] & B. This pattern was much more common for the non-Urn 
problems than for the Urn problem (Q(1) = 15.06, p < .OOl). The non- 
Urn problems did not differ among themselves in the incidence of that 
pattern (Q(3) = 4.34, ns). 
Discussion 
The comparative paucity of conjunction errors on the Urn problem 
suggests that many people do indeed have an understanding of the con- 
junction rule. Apparently, however, they are much less likely to apply it 
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to problems with more naturalistic content; instead, they rely on judg- 
ment procedures that sometimes conflict with the conjunction rule. As 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) noted, this is unusual, since natural rather 
than abstract problem content often enhances performance on reasoning 
tasks (e.g., Gilhooly & Falconer, 1974). 
Study 1 demonstrated that conjunction errors are almost as common in 
judgment problems in which marginal events rest on unrelated processes 
as they are in problems involving common processes. Considering also 
the fact that a substantial minority of subjects did commit conjunction 
errors on the Urn problem, the results of Study 1 indicate that procedures 
involving natural assessments are not the only ones that cause people to 
make conjunction errors. Formalistic procedures, exemplified by the av- 
eraging of quantitative probability judgments, seem to be plausible candi- 
dates as the source of some of those errors. 
STUDIES 2 AND 3 
Studies 2 and 3 were designed to gather additional data on the inci- 
dence of conjunction errors involving marginal events resting on both 
common and unrelated processes. Study 1 provided indirect evidence for 
formalistic judgment procedures leading to conjunction errors. And al- 
though that evidence is consistent with averaging as the particular for- 
malistic procedure yielding conjunction errors, the possibility exists that 
there are other such procedures. So Studies 2 and 3 also served an ex- 
ploratory function. The plan was to have subjects articulate the reasoning 
they use when they solve judgment problems similar to those typically 
presented in studies of conjunction errors. The resulting protocols could 
then be examined for clues as to the judgment procedures that cause 
people to commit such errors, These suggested procedures could then be 
subjected to more rigorous verification testing by experimental means. 
Subjects 
Method 
Forty-six students in an upper level undergraduate psychology course 
at the University of Michigan participated in Study 2 as an exercise used 
in introducing the conjunction error phenomenon. They were not paid. 
Thirty-three University of Michigan students served as paid subjects in 
Study 3. They were recruited from a departmental subject pool. 
Materials 
Each subject considered six judgment problems presented in a ques- 
tionnaire. As in Study 1, each problem required the subject to rank order 
four events by their probability of occurrence, using the number 1 for the 
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most likely event through 4 for the least likely event. The four events 
included two marginal events, which can be denoted by A and B. Event 
A was expected to be considered highly likely by most subjects; event B 
was expected to be judged quite unlikely. In half the problems events A 
and B were generated by what we assumed to be common processes; 
they arose from unrelated processes in the other problems. The third and 
fourth events in a given problem were the conjunctive events [A & B] and 
[A’ & B’]. For a given problem, the marginal events were described first, 
then the conjunctive events. For half the problems event A appeared be- 
fore event B; conversely for the other problems. There was a similar 
counterbalancing in the presentation orders for the two conjunctive 
events. The Appendix contains descriptions of events A and B in the 
judgment problems considered by the subjects. 
Procedure 
Subjects in Study 2 participated in a single group session, although 
they were required to complete their tasks independently. Instructions 
were presented orally as well as in each subject’s questionnaire. Subjects 
were encouraged to ask questions if they felt they did not understand 
their task. Besides rank ordering the probabilities of the events in each 
problem, the subject was instructed: “After you have ranked the events, 
you should briefly, i.e., in no more than 5-8 lines, indicate why you 
ranked the events the way you did.” 
Subjects in Study 3 participated in individual, tape-recorded sessions. 
After receiving general instructions about the task of rank ordering 
events in terms of their probability, the subject was also asked to read 
each problem out loud. This was intended to ensure that the subject un- 
derstood each problem correctly. The subject was also told the following: 
As you are thinking about your solution to the problem, say what is going through 
your mind. In other words, think out loud. What’s your reasoning, your rationale? 
Don’t worry about whether or not something sounds right or sounds silly. You 
should speak your thoughts as they occur lo you. Don’t hold back until after you 
have made up your mind. 
This concurrent reporting procedure was intended to counteract potential 
memory-related biases (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). The final instruction was for the subject to write down his or her 
judgments as they were decided. 
Results and Discussion 
Conjunction Error Frequencies 
Table 3 presents the percentages of conjunction errors observed in the 
various judgment problems. The relevant rows of the table are those indi- 
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TABLE 3 
JUDGMENT PROBLEM CONJUNCTION ERROR PERCENTAGES, STUDIES 2-4 
Percentage 
conjunction errors’,” 



























































3, ,6*“%X 68.4 0.0 
53.9 26.5 19.6 
5,,5**** 21.8 26.7 



























” C-common processes; C/--unrelated processes. 
h LL-event A and event B likely; LU-event A likely. event B unlikely: UU-event A 
and event B unlikely. 
c Percentages sometimes do not sum to 100 due to rounding error. 
d Significance tests and levels apply to across-problem percentages within ensembles. 
(’ Significance tests and levels involve Study 2 versus Study 4 and Study 3 versus Study 4. 
* p < .lO. 
** p < .05. 
“**p < .Ol. 
**** p < ,001. 
cated in the Study column to refer to either Study 2, Study 3, or both. 
The designation “LU” in the Chances column is a reminder that, in each 
case, the subject was expected to consider event A likely and event B 
unlikely. As in Study 1, conjunction errors occurred just about equally 
often when event-generating processes were unrelated as when they were 
common. Four of the problems considered by subjects in Studies 2 and 3 
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were identical in the two studies. Two involved common (C) processes, 
the others unrelated (U) processes. The difference in the incidence of 
conjunction errors across problems was not statistically significant (Q(3) 
= 4.29, ns). 
Judgment Procedures 
The subjects’ written and tape-recorded protocols were examined for 
indications of the procedures they used in arriving at judgments about the 
likelihood of the conjunctive event [A & B] relative to the likelihoods of 
the marginal events A and B. The subjects’ statements did not have suffi- 
cient clarity to always reliably distinguish when the subject was using one 
approach to the task rather than another. Moreover, the interpretation of 
protocols is always inescapably a subjective exercise. Nevertheless, 
there were still many instances in which subjects did appear to definitely 
employ one particular strategy. Responses in those instances allowed us 
to assemble a taxonomy of several procedures that at least some of the 
subjects used some of the time. 
Following are the procedures and representative protocol excerpts il- 
lustrating them: 
Extensional reasoning-concept. Some subjects’ opinions agreed with 
the conjunction rule because their judgment procedures involved exten- 
sional reasoning. In some cases, this strategy appeared to be sponta- 
neous, resting on a fundamental, untutored understanding of extensional 
principles (example: “3 [A & B], 4 [A’ & B’] have two requirements 
making them more difficult to fulfill” [McEnroe-Study 2-Subject 421). 
Extensional reasoning-probability theory. Other subjects considered 
conjunctions less likely than constituent marginal events because they 
applied probability theory rules recalled from their studies (example? 
“I’m gonna give something . . . 90% probability to {B}. To {A} I’m gonna 
give 80% probability because in Europe . . . there are many missiles 
aimed to Russia. . . . While the combination of both events is gonna be 
82 . . . no, 72%, the multiplication of {A} and {B}, that’s why {A & B} is 
gonna be smaller” [USSR-Study 3-Subject 51). 
Marginal event misunderstanding. As hypothesized by yarkus and 
Zajonc (in press), some subjects committed conjunction errors because 
they interpreted the marginal event B as the conjunction [A’ & B] (ex- 
ample: “{A & B} is higher than {B} because the only way he can get away 
wl increasing military [B] is to increase something else [A]” [Reagan- 
Study 2-Subject 401). 
Representativeness. Some subjects’ judgments appeared to rest on the 
3 Expressions in braces refer to the subject’s literal statement interpreted in terms of the 
events labeled A and B. 
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representativeness heuristic (example: “The choices seem consistent 
with Reaganomics.” [Note: Gave ranking A >L [A & Bl >t. [A’ & B’] >t. 
B.] [Reagan-Study 2--Subject 391). 
Substantive reasoning. It was especially common for subjects to justify 
their ordering of marginal and conjunctive events on the basis of argu- 
ments involving the substance of the given situation. Sometimes those 
arguments led to judgments consistent with the conjunction rule, other 
times not (example: “John tends to win most matches, but losing in the 
first set could make him play harder, and intimidate his opponent even 
more” [McEnroe-Study 2-Subject 231). 
Averaging. Several subjects made judgments that appeared to rest on 
the reasoning implicit in averaging (example: “I am certain that UM will 
win at least four games, thus {A} = No. I. I am so sure of this that even 
though I feel it is least likely that Syria and Israel will sign ({B} = No. 4) 
it carries enough weight so that the combined aspects are rated second- 
most likely ({A & B} = No. 2)” [Football/Mideast-Study 2-Subject 
121). 
Signed summation. A new formalistic approach we have called 
“signed summation” seemed to emerge. This procedure occurs in two 
stages. In the first, the person classifies each marginal event as “likely,” 
“unlikely,” or neither. In the second stage, the person derives a judg- 
ment of the chances for the conjunction of the marginal events from the 
perceived chances for the marginal events. When conjoined, two likely 
(unlikely) events are seen as even more likely (unlikely) than either (ex- 
ample : “These two separate events (Congress [raising] taxes, & no Bo 
nomination) are almost guaranteed locks I believe. Putting them both in 
the same statement [A’ & B’] then must be rated wi the highest prob.’ 
[Congress/Derek-Study 2-Subject 81). The likelihood of a conjunction 
of a likely and an unlikely event is something of a compromise. 
It is noteworthy that individual subjects often used several procedures. 
sometimes even in the same problem. One might expect that. if the sub- 
ject happened to use extensional reasoning on one problem, then he or 
she would continue to use that strategy, evidencing a type of insight. This 
did not always happen. Some amount of insight might have taken place, 
however. Suppose a subject made no conjunction errors on Problem N in 
the series of six considered. Then the subject was significantly more 
likely to make no conjunction errors on Problem N + 1 than had he or 
she made at least one error on Problem N (45.0% vs 15.3%). This com- 
parison assumes that at least one error had been made on Problem N - 
1; i.e., that the insight had not occurred on the previous problem. 
STUDY 4 
The most surprising outcome of Studies 2 and 3 was the suggestion of a 
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new formalistic approach to making likelihood judgments, the signed 
summation procedure. The procedure can be stated more formally as the 
following signed sum model of qualitative likelihood judgment. 
The qualitative likelihood function A is defined over the relevant family 
of events. The range of A includes the entire real line. In particular, the 
qualitative likelihood of arbitrary event E, A(E), can be negative. 
For events E and F, h(E) > A(F) if and only if E >L F, i.e., E is judged 
more likely than F. Similarly, A(E) = A(F) if and only if E =L F, i.e., E 
and F are judged equally likely. As a natural extension, A(E) 2 A(F) is 
equivalent to the judgment that E is at least as likely as F, E + F. 
An event E is defined as likely if it is judged more likely than its com- 
plement, i.e., E >= E’. Likely events have positive qualitative likeli- 
hoods. That is, if E is likely, then A(E) > 0. 
Event E is said to be unlikely if it is considered less likely than its 
complement, i.e., E’ >L E. Unlikely events are assigned negative qualita- 
tive likelihoods. So if E is unlikely, then A(E) < 0. 
An indifferent event is defined as one that is neither likely nor unlikely. 
In other words, if E is indifferent, then it is judged to be just as likely to 
occur as to not occur: E == E’. The corresponding qualitative likeli- 
hoods would be zero, i.e., A(E) = A(E’) = 0. 
The signed sum rule specifies the relationship between the qualitative 
likelihood of a conjunction and the qualitative likelihoods of the constit- 
uent marginal events: For events E and F, with conjunction [E & F], 
A(E & F) = A(E) + A(F). 
This completes the statement of the signed sum model. 
(1) 
The signed sum model implies that conjunction errors can occur, but 
only under specified conditions. Figure 1 illustrates the model’s predic- 
tions regarding the relative chances of conjunctions and their constituent 
marginal events. Suppose that events A and B are both considered likely 
to occur. The signed sum model says that their conjunction should be 
seen as especially likely to happen. In particular, as Case 1 in Fig. 1 
suggests, the subject should make double conjunction errors, i.e., [A & 
Bl >= A and [A & B] >L B. 
Now suppose that event A is judged likely, whereas event B is consid- 
ered unlikely. Then, as illustrated in Cases 2-3 in Fig. 1, according to the 
signed sum model, the conjunction could be either likely or unlikely. The 
resolution of the conflict depends on the relative degrees of likeliness and 
unlikeliness of events A and B. If A is more likely than B is unlikely, then 
[A & B] will be likely; conversely, if the imbalance is in the opposite 
direction. In either case, the subject should make a single conjunction 
error, [A & B] >L B. 
Finally, consider the circumstance in which both event A and event B 
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CASE 1: A LIKELY - B LIKELY 
h(A&B) = h(A) + h(B) 
b 
Predkztlon: 2 co”,““ctlon errors 
CASE 2: A LIKELY - B SOMEWHAT UNLIKELY 
h(A&B) = A(A) + h(B) 
h(B)-- 
Prediction 1 conjunctvm error 
CASE 3: A SOMEWHAT LIKELY - 8 UNLIKELY 
h(A&B) = h(A) + h(B) 
w- 
Predxtion 1 con,unct,on error 
CASE 4: A UNLIKELY - B UNLIKELY 
A(A&B) = h(A) + h(B) 
hB)- 
Predictfon 0 conjunction errors 
FIG. 1. Qualitative likelihoods and conjunction error predictions according to the signed 
sum model. 
are seen as unlikely. The signed sum model prescribes that their conjunc- 
tion should be thought very unlikely. As indicated in Case 4 of Fig. 1, the 
subject should not commit a conjunction error in such a situation. 
Studies l-3 support the conclusion that no single procedure is likely to 
account for all subjects’ judgments of the relative chances of conjunctive 
and marginal events. Indeed, they indicate that even a single individual is 
unlikely to use only one judgment procedure all the time. However, the 
exploratory data of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that a procedure equivalent to 
the signed sum model is among the procedures at least some subjects use 
on some occasions. Study 4 was intended to test this model according to 
the qualitative predictions outlined above. 
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred five subjects participated in Study 4. They were recruited 
from the general student and employee community of the University of 
Michigan and a local law office. The subjects were paid. 
Materials 
The basic judgment task of subjects in Study 4 was the same as that in 
Studies 2 and 3. That is, the subjects were required to rank order in 
judged probability four events of the form A, B, [A & B], and [A’ & B’]. 
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The Appendix presents the particulars of the eight ensembles of problems 
considered by the subjects. The first six ensembles contained problems 
with the same subject matter as those in Studies 2 and 3. The last two 
ensembles, containing the Election/“Breakin’ ” and the Cars/Tigers 
problems, concerned topics not considered previously. 
Recall that all the problems in Studies 2 and 3 were such that event A 
was expected to be seen as likely and event B as unlikely. So the re- 
sponses of subjects in those studies could be used as part of the data for 
testing the signed sum model. Some of the additional problems added to 
each ensemble in Study 4 were such that both event A and event B 
should have been perceived as likely by most subjects. These problems 
can be distinguished from others by the notation “LL.” Study 4 also 
included problems in which events A and B were both expected to be 
considered unlikely. Such problems can be characterized by “UU.” 
The ElectionP‘Breakin ” and Cars/Tigers problems differed slightly 
from the others in the following way. Besides events A, B, and [A & B], 
the fourth event in these problems was the disjunction [A or B] rather 
than the conjunction [A’ & B’]. This manipulation was intended to test 
the robustness of the effects predicted by the signed sum model. 
Two forms of the questionnaire containing the Study 4 problems were 
constructed. Each of the alternate forms contained either the LL or the 
UU form of each problem in each ensemble. The assignment of problems 
to forms was random, with the constraint that each form contained an 
equal number of LL and UU problems. 
Procedure 
Questionnaire forms were assigned to subjects at random. Subjects 
were given the opportunity to ask questions before completing the ques- 
tionnaires. They were required to work alone. 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 2 contains a graphic display of the percentages of subjects who 
made zero, one, or two conjunction errors on the LL, LU, and UU 
problems in the McEnroe and in the Football/Mideast ensembles. These 
were the ensembles used to test all three of the signed sum model predic- 
tions described above. Zero conjunction errors were most common in 
UU problems as compared to LU and LL problems. Also, as expected, 
single conjunction errors were much more frequent in LU rather than LL 
and UU problems. Finally, double conjunction errors were numerous 
only in LL problems. 
Table 3 contains the actual percentages of subjects making zero, one, 
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CONJUNCTION ERRORS CONJUNCTION ERRORS 
FIG. 2. Percentage of conjunction error frequencies by expected marginal event likeli- 
hood classification: (a) McEnroe ensemble; (b) Football/Mideast ensemble. LL-event A 
and event B likely; LU-event A likely, event B unlikely; UU-event A and event B 
unlikely. 
and two conjunction errors in each of the problem ensembles. In all ex- 
cept the Weather/AIDS ensemble, negative significance tests indicated 
that subjects in Study 3 responded to particular LU problems the same 
way those in Study 2 did. That is why the error percentages for that 
problem are listed separately by study rather than pooled. For every en- 
semble, the pattern of error frequencies was as predicted by the signed 
sum model (p < .Ol in all instances except one, by x2). 
The signed sum model predicts that, when both event A and event B 
are likely, their conjunction [A & B] should be more likely than either of 
them. The present data suggest that, in many instances, [A & B] will be 
judged more likely than even the disjunction [A or B]. In the 
Election/“Breakin’ ” LL problem, 46% of the subjects considered the 
conjunction more likely than the disjunction. In the Cars/Tigers LL 
problem, the corresponding proportion was even higher, 54.9%. So the 
predicted effects appear to be quite robust. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Several conclusions follow from the present studies. People make 
judgments about the relative chances of marginal and conjunctive events 
according to numerous different procedures. Some of those procedures 
admit conjunction errors, i.e., judgments that a conjunction is more likely 
than one of the constituent marginal events; others do not. There is 
no reason to doubt that, as previously demonstrated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1982, 1983), some conjunction errors result from judgment ac- 
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cording to “natural assessments,” such as representativeness and avail- 
ability. However, conjunction errors also arise from various other proce- 
dures, including “formalistic” ones. 
One formalistic procedure some people use is “signed summation.” 
This judgment method proceeds in two stages. First, the person deter- 
mines the qualitative likelihoods of the two relevant marginal events, in- 
cluding whether each is “likely” or “unlikely.” The qualitative likeli- 
hood of their conjunction is then derived from their individual qualitative 
likelihoods. This is done in a fashion equivalent to the summation of 
signed real numbers. Under specified conditions, this procedure yields 
zero, one, or two conjunction errors in a given judgment problem. 
The signed sum model differs most notably from previously recognized 
judgment procedures in its categorization of events as either likely or 
unlikely, rather than simply locating them on a unidirectional continuum 
of certainty. The form of the signed sum model is different from an aver- 
aging model that involves only the events explicitly presented to the 
person. If events A and B are not considered equally likely, such a model 
would always predict a single conjunction error. The signed sum model 
and averaging agree, however, if certain strong assumptions are made. 
Suppose the person has an initial opinion I about the chances that the 
conjunction of events A and B is going to happen, e.g., that it is twice as 
likely to occur as not occur. Let s(fl denote a scale value for opinion 1. 
Similarly, let s(A) and s(B) indicate the scale values for the person’s 
opinions that events A and B will occur, with high values implying 
greater chances. The parameters w(Z), w(A), and w(B) can be taken as 
weights corresponding to the impact of the respective opinions on the 
person’s judgment of how likely the conjunction [A 8z B] is. A rule sim- 
ilar to Anderson’s (1965) weighted averaging model with an initial im- 
pression would characterize the scale value of [A & B] as follows: 
s(A & B) = 
wVM0 + w(A)@) + w(B)@) 
w(Z) + w(A) + w(B) ’ 
(2) 
Unlike an “ordinary averaging rule” involving only s(A) and s(B), this 
“initial impression averaging rule” does not require that s(A & B) be 
between s(A) and s(B). In particular, it leads to the same type of event 
orderings as the signed sum rule, if saying a marginal event is “likely” 
means its chances of occurrence are considered better than the initial 
opinion of the conjunction’s chances, and “unlikely” means the oppo- 
site. 
So one critical distinction between signed summation and initial 
impression averaging is whether, when considering the likelihood of a 
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marginal event, the person makes reference to an initial opinion about 
[A & B] rather than some absolute standard of what is “likely.” The 
protocol data from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that the latter is more plau- 
sible. Future experiments intended to more rigorously differentiate the 
models will exploit this distinction. At the present time, the signed sum 
model is concerned only with qualitative, i.e., ordinal, likelihood judg- 
ments. Later the model will be extended in an attempt to account for 
quantitative opinions, e.g., probability judgments. It should be straight- 
forward to experimentally contrast the initial impression averaging model 
from a quantitative version of the signed sum rule. This can be done using 
procedures involving three or more marginal events (cf. Anderson, 1965, 
1981). That the currently available data do not sharply distinguish the 
signed sum model and the initial impression averaging model does not 
detract from the fact that either accounts forjudgments that other models 
have difficulty explaining. 
Within a given problem, the majority of conjunction error frequencies 
did not always conform to the predictions of the signed sum model (e.g., 
in the LL problems depicted in Fig. 2). However, we chose as our bases 
of comparison the numbers of conjunction errors subjects would make on 
different problem types, e.g., LL versus UU and LU. This seemed more 
meaningful than a comparison against a uniform distribution, since 
subjects do not normally make their judgments randomly. Nevertheless, 
it is clear that, although the model can explain some conjunction errors, 
by no means does it explain them all. Part of the reason for the lack of a 
perfect fit to the model is that there are large individual differences in 
how subjects view the chances of the marginal events. For instance (sur- 
prisingly), some subjects did not consider it more likely that “60 
Minutes” would be the most watched television program of the 
1984-1985 season than that the average conventional home mortgage in- 
terest rate would fall below 10%. As suggested by the protocols of 
Studies 2 and 3, another reason is that people simply use multiple 
methods in arriving at likelihood judgments. 
It is highly adaptive that people have a broad repertoire of likelihood 
judgment procedures. This characteristic is reminiscent of the “equipo- 
tentiality” exhibited by neurological systems, whereby if one part of the 
brain is destroyed, other parts will sometimes assume functions ordi- 
narily performed by the damaged part (Lashley, 1950). Thus, when judg- 
ment problems arise, we will seldom be caught “procedureless,” as it 
were. Nevertheless, a fundamentally important question is raised by this 
wealth of procedures: How is a particular procedure assigned to a given 
judgment task? We have seen from Study 1 that most subjects appear to 
know the conjunction rule. So why do they not routinely apply it and 
thereby avoid making conjunction errors? 
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It will be some time before a full understanding of judgment procedure 
assignment principles is achieved. However, one candidate principle is 
that the characteristics of the judgment problem will significantly influ- 
ence which procedure is called forth from the subject’s repertoire. This 
principle seems to be the one implied by Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
when they proposed (p. 3 10) that “a judgment of probability or frequency 
is commonly biased toward the natural assessment that the problem 
evokes.” In Study 1 the Urn problem was correctly solved much more 
often than the naturalistic problems. In Studies 2 and 3 it was found that 
substantive reasoning was an especially common means by which sub- 
jects ordered the events they considered. These results suggest that, in 
realistic problems with interesting content, attention is so heavily con- 
sumed by the content that it simply does not occur to the person to apply 
well-understood principles such as extension. 
APPENDIX 
Table Al describes the marginal events A and B for the judgment 
problems subjects considered in Studies 2-4. The problems are orga- 
nized into Ensembles according to their subject matter. The Processes 
TABLE Al 
JUDGMENT PROBLEM FEATURES. STUDIES 2-4 
Ensemble Processes Study Chances Event A Event B 
McEnroe Co 4 LLb 
213 LU 
4 UU 




Reagan C 213 LU 
4 uu 
McEnroe will win the 
match 
McEnroe will win the 
match 
McEnroe will lose the 
match 
The University of 
Michigan will win at 
least 4 of its 11 
games during the 1984 
football season 
The University of 
Michigan will win at 
least 4 of its 11 
games during the 1984 
football season 
The University of 
Michigan will win 
fewer than 4 of its 11 
games during the 1984 
football season 
President Reagan will 
provide for increased 
military spending 
President Reagan will 
provide for decreased 
military spending 
McEnroe will win the 
tirst set 
McEnroe will lose the 
first set 
McEnroe will lose the 
first set 
Syria and Israel will not 
sign a peace treaty 
with each other this 
year 
Syria and Israel will 
sign a peace treaty 
with each other this 
year 
Syria and Israel will 
sign a peace treaty 
with each other this 
year 
Reagan will provide 
federal support for 
unwed mothers 
Reagan will provide 
federal support for 
unwed mothers 
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TABLE Al -Continued 
Ensemble Processes Study Chances Event A Event B 
“60 Minutes”/ U 
mortgages 


























“60 Minutes” will be the The average conventional 
most watched tele- home mortgage interest 
vision program of the rate will remain above 
1984-85 season I 0% 
“60 Minutes” will be the The average conventional 
most watched tele- home mortgage interest 
vision program of the rate will fall below 
1984-85 season 10% 
The Soviet Union will 
keep its troops in 
Afghanistan 
The Soviet Union will 
maintain its 
intermediate range 
missiles aimed at 
Western Europe 
The Soviet Union wtll 
dismantle its 
intermediate range 
missiles aimed at 
Western Europe 
The Soviet Union will 
keep its troops in 
Afghanistan 
It will be warmer on May 
15 than on March 30 
It will be warmer on 
September 15 than on 
October 30 
It will be warmer on 
October 30 than on 
September 15 
Congress will avoid 
raising taxes in this 
election year 
Ronald Reagan will carry The movie “Breakin’ ” will 
the South in the not be nominated for 
November Presidential an Academy Award as 
election “Best Picture” 
Walter Mondale will carry The movie “Breakin’ ” will 
the South in the be nominated for an 
November Presidential Academy Award as “Best 
election Picture” 
U.S. auto companies will The Detroit Tigers will 
raise their average end the season with 
car prices by at least a better record than 
$25 the Cleveland Indians 
U.S. auto companies will The Detroit Tigers will 
raise their average end the season with no 
car prices by less better record than the 
than $25 Cleveland Indians 
An effective treatment 
for AIDS (Acquired 
Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome) will be 
found within the year 
An effective treatment 
for AIDS (Acquired 
Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome) will be 
found within the year 
An effective treatment 
for AIDS (Acquired 
Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome) will be 
found within the year 
Bo Derek will be 
nominated for an 
Academy Award for her 
performance in her 
latest film 
Q C-common processes; U-unrelated processes. 
b LL-event A and event B likely; LU-event A likely, event B unlikely: UU-event A and event B 
unlikely. 
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column indicates whether events A and B are generated by either 
common (C) or unrelated (U) processes. The Study column indicates the 
study in which a particular problem was presented. The Chances column 
notes whether each event was expected to be considered highly likely (L) 
or unlikely (U) by the typical subject. The expectation for event A is 
listed first, that for event B second. 
Unless instructed otherwise, the subject was asked to evaluate the 
probabilities that various events considered in a given problem would 
occur within the next year, “between today and a year from today.” The 
tennis match referred to in the McEnroe ensemble was McEnroe’s first- 
round singles match in the 1984 U.S. Open tournament. 
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